We consider a small open developing economy, whose population is bifurcated into a majority and a minority group, the latter lacking political in ‡uence. Agents are heterogeneous in skills, and decide whether to invest in education when young and whether to migrate in their adulthood. Assuming a rentextraction basis for discrimination, we …rst endogenize ethnic discrimination in the benchmark case of an economy closed to migration, and then explore how migration prospects a¤ect ethnic inequality. Under the free migration assumption, we …nd the intuitive result that migration prospects have a protective e¤ect on the minority. Moreover, the optimal discrimination rate (from the majority's perspective) is shown to be such that there is no migration at equilibrium, unless the distribution of individuals' skills exhibits marked asymmetries. Last, we …nd that immigration restrictions set by receiving countries have the paradoxical e¤ect of creating migration ‡ows which would otherwise have remained latent.
Introduction
The connection between migration, ethnic discrimination, and education, is a relatively neglected issue in development economics.
1 This is quite surprising, since minority groups often represent a substantial proportion of a developing country's emigrants and are relatively highly educated. The phenomenon is di¢cult to quantify because receiving countries generally ignore the ethnic a¢liation of their immigrants. An exception is the recent Australian data on immigrants from Malaysia, Sri Lanka, and Fiji, three ethnically-divided countries which have minorities subject to discrimination. The data show that among the immigrants sampled, minority members are signi…cantly over-represented and better educated than members of their respective relevant majority group.
2 This is also con…rmed by many country studies on intergroup di¤erences in education and migration pro…les. For example, the studies of Gani and Ward (1995) on Fiji, or the evidence on labor migration in Asia presented in Martin (1991) , show that members of minorities tend to be more mobile and educated than the rest of the population, due to cultural as well as economic factors. In their research on the sources of ethnic inequality in Vietnam, van de Walle and Gunewardena (2000) also found substantial returns to migration for the educated members of the minority. These behavioral patterns are not new to labor economists; indeed, standard human capital theory (e.g., Levhari and Weiss, 1974, Brenner and Kiefer, 1981) suggests that members of discriminated-against minorities would massively invest in education if this provides them with a means of avoiding discrimination. This would seem to be particularly relevant in the context of migration, since education has been shown to provide its owners with exit options Detragiache, 1999, Katz and Rapoport, 2000) .
From a more macroeconomic perspective, there is a growing interest in the e¤ects of ethnic fractionalization on growth. The …rst argument put forward was that ethnic diversity might translate into political polarization, and, therefore, impede the adoption of e¢cient policies.
3 It was then suggested that ethnic diversity may contribute to political instability, thereby discouraging domestic as well as foreign investments (Barro and Lee, 1993, Alesina et al., 1996) . In addition, ethnic diversity may also cause market segmentation, thereby limiting the scope for potential economies of scale. At the empirical level, Easterly and Levine (1997) asserted that ethnic diversity is central to explaining cross-country di¤erences in economic performance in sub-Saharan Africa. They interpreted this as showing that ethnic fractionalization leads to social con ‡icts, political instability, and the adoption of ine¢cient economic policies, including discrimination against minorities. These …ndings have been chal-lenged notably by Collier and Gunning (1999) , who point out that fractionalization per se is of little interest since the negative growth e¤ect of ethnic diversity only applies in societies lacking political rights. 4 Until recently, however, ethnic discrimination has mostly been treated as an exogenous trait, inherited from a country's speci…c culture and history. In an attempt to endogenize such discriminations and con ‡icts, the recent literature on the political economy of growth suggested two possible economic rationales for ethnic discrimination (Bardhan, 1997 , Bates, 1999 , Horowitz, 1998 : the hostility externality, and the redistribution motive. To use a distinction proposed by Horowitz (1998) , the hostility theory proposes a hard view of ethnic con ‡icts, while the redistribution theory endorses a soft view. In the …rst approach (e.g., Wintrobe, 1996 , Azam, 2000 , the group in power -the majority -has a distate for the well-being of minorities, and aims to harm them, using the government as a (costly) means of in ‡icting hostility up to a given point. In the second approach, as advocated, for example, by Benhabib and Rustichini (1996) , Congleton (1996) , and Benabou (1996) , the group in power builds on the lack of political rights and in ‡uence of the minority to promote an ethnically biased redistribution, whether through direct or indirect means. Obviously, the hostility theory would seem to apply to phenomena that range from market discrimination to secular con ‡icts culminating in ethnic violence and civil war. By contrast, the redistribution theory would apply mainly to governmental discrimination (access to public jobs and loans, budget allocation on an ethnic basis, ethnically biased tax systems, etc.). The two theories, however, are not mutually exclusive, and their di¤erences should not be overstated. On the contrary, it seems obvious that these two types of motives can coexist and feed o¤ one another (Carlton, 1995) .
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Along the lines suggested by the second approach, we assume a rent-maximizing government, whose objective is to maximize the welfare of a privileged group (henceforth, the majority). In our model, people make two decisions: whether to invest in education during their youth; and whether to emigrate as adults. Both of these are a¤ected by the anticipated domestic discrimination, which, in our setting, takes the form of proportional taxation of the educated fraction of the minority, with lump-sum redistribution within the majority. These assumptions are discussed below. Instead of focusing on the growth e¤ects of such policies, as in the above cited literature, we focus on how migration prospects may a¤ect ethnic inequality when discrimination is endogenous. Our approach has some similarities to that of Epstein et al. (1999) , Rapoport (1999), and Tremblay (2000) . In contrast to Docquier and Rapoport (1999) , where migrants are picked up randomly by immigration authorities, we assume proportional taxation, as indicated above, rather than a poll tax. This results in a self-selection process, whereby, consistently with existing data, migration is more likely for the most highly skilled (see, e.g., Carrington and Detragiache, 1999) . In contrast to Epstein et al. (1999) and Tremblay (2000) , where individual productivity is given, individual productivity depends on education decisions. As a result, from the majority's perspective, there is a tradeo¤ between the amount of the tax rate and the number of taxpayers, so that ethnic discrimination is endogenously limited even in the case of a closed economy.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the formal framework of the model and discusses its main assumptions. Section 3 details the results for three di¤erent possible distributions of individuals' inherited skills, and examines the sensitivity of the results with respect to the choice of a particular distribution. Section 4 introduces uncertainty into the model in the form of immigration restrictions set by the receiving countries, and studies how these a¤ect equilibrium outcomes. Section 5 o¤ers the conclusions and suggests extensions for further research.
A rent-maximizing model
We consider a small open developing economy, whose population is divided between a majority group (denoted by M ) and a minority group (denoted by m), the latter lacking political in ‡uence. Individuals are born with a given minimal endowment of human capital (normalized to 1), and with heterogeneous learning abilities: each individual is characterized by his personal ability to learn, i.e., to transform a given educational investment into productive skills. The learning ability of an individual, denoted by a, is distributed according to a density function f (a) of mass 1 on the space [a; a]:
The distribution is the same for the majority and the minority. Two generations coexist. During the …rst period, people have the possibility of investing in education, so as to improve their productivity in the second period. The education decision is a "take it or leave it" choice. There is a unique educational program which requires a …xed time cost e; expressed as a proportion of the …rst period duration. An educated agent is endowed with 1 + a e¢ciency units of labor to supply when old. Non-educated agents, on the other hand, keep the same unitary level of human capital over their whole lifetime. The no-investment income is assumed to re ‡ect the subsistence minimum required in that economy.
We formalize ethnic discrimination through a proportional tax, extracted on the educated fraction of the minority, and equally redistributed among the majority. This tax is assumed to re ‡ect the various distortions in the taxation system penalizing the minority. For example, the tax structure may be designed to penalize activities in which ethnic minorities are over-represented, or …scal privileges may be o¤ered to the government's ethnic constituency. Alternatively, minority members may be victims of …nancial extortion, or forced to use bribes or majority name-lenders to circumvent ethnic restrictions. It is assumed that non educated agents remain at the subsistence level, thereby escaping taxation. Being educated, therefore, signals ability to pay the ethnic tax, which is levied on the educated only. Last, since we are not interested in the fate of the majority elite, or in the growth e¤ects of discrimination, we assume for analytical convenience a lump-sum redistribution within the majority, i.e., redistribution equally bene…ts every member of the majority, whether educated or not.
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The constant tax rate is denoted by t. Education is assumed to provide its owners with a passport to a discrimination-free country, whose factor prices are equal 7 and una¤ected by migration. There is a …xed migration cost C.
The education decision is taken during the …rst period, while the migration decision is taken at the beginning of the second period. A minority member of type a thus compares his life-cycle income W m a in three possible situations: -Not investing in education and staying in the home country:
-Investing in education and staying in the home country:
-Investing in education and emigrating:
where R denotes the private discount rate on future earnings (1 plus the interest rate). The comparison of these three alternatives determines two critical ability thresholds. The …rst threshold characterizes the minority member who is indi¤erent about whether to invest in education:
. The second ability threshold characterizes the educated member of the minority who is indi¤erent about whether to emigrate: a m = a m c2´C t
. Agents falling in the range between the minimal ability a and the critical ability a m c1 opt for alternative 1, agents in the range between a m c1 and a m c2 choose alternative 2, and agents in the range between a m c2 and the maximal ability a opt for alternative 3. To avoid trivial solutions, we make the assumption that the agent with the highest ability would choose to invest in education in the absence of discrimination:
6 Obviously, redistribution only within the educated fraction of the majority would create further incentives for education for the majority, thus giving rise to rent-seeking activities.
7 This is to neutralize the incentives for emigration based on inter-country wage di¤erentials. Such incentives have already been extensively discussed in previous literature.
Note that Assumption 1 does not preclude that, if a m c2 = C t is higher than a (that is, for su¢ciently low discrimination tax rates), no one chooses to emigrate.
Given the terms at the right hand side of equations (1)- (2)- (3), the possible alternatives are graphically represented in Fig. 1 for a given discrimination rate: All the agents who opt for alternative 1 (no investment in education) are in zone I, all the agents who opt for alternative 2 (education without emigration) are in zone II, while the most capable agents, those who choose to invest in education and emigrate, are in zone III. As the tax rate increases, zone I and III are increased while zone II is decreased. Indeed, more discrimination, on the one hand, deters investment in education, and, on the other hand, pushes more educated members of the minority towards emigration. It may easily be shown that if t¸C eR+C , zone II becomes empty. In this case, no educated minority members remain in the country, so that the discrimination revenue falls to zero.
Under the rational discrimination assumption, there are two mechanisms whereby minority members are protected against "excessive" discrimination. First, the tax rate must be such that a su¢cient number of agents opt for education; second, the tax rate must be such that a su¢cient number of educated agents choose to stay in their origin country. Formally, zone II delimits the fraction of the minority on which the discrimination rent is extracted. The lower bound of this interval is unambiguously given by eR 1¡t
; while the upper bound may either be C t or a; depending on whether some of the educated minority members actually emigrate. Typically, if C t > a, the migration cost is too high (or, alternatively, the discrimination tax rate is too low) to induce migration. Therefore, the relevant fraction of the minority that is subject to taxation is given by the interval ; min
; a´i. Note that the critical values for the majority (which correspond to those for the minority for t = 0) are respectively given by a . This implies: (i) that the proportion of the educated is always higher within the majority than in the minority; and (ii) that none of the majority members are willing to emigrate.
Let ® denote the share of the minority in the total population and 1 ¡ ® the share of the majority. The optimal discrimination rate from the majority's perspective is given by:
af (a)da
where the per-capita rent between brackets is de…ned for 0 < t < C eR+C ; and the integral measures the taxpayers' average ability.
Endogenous discrimination under several ability distributions
As shown in equation (4), the equilibrium discrimination tax rate strongly depends on the minority's ability distribution. The intuition for this is the following. Consider a given initial level for the discrimination tax rate, t 0 . How does a marginal increase in that rate a¤ect the aggregated rent extracted from the minority? On the one hand, the gain is obvious: the educated who stay in the home country pay more. But, on the other hand, the number of taxpayers decreases as a result of increased emigration and a fall in the human capital formation within the minority. The …rst e¤ect is highly detrimental for rent maximization since it a¤ects the individuals with the highest abilities (those who pay the highest taxes). Its magnitude, and, therefore, the total e¤ect of a marginal tax increase, is clearly depending on the ability density at the right of C=t 0 . Examining this problem at a (i.e. for t 0 = C=a), it is obvious that the choice to discriminate above t 0 strongly depends on the relative thickness of the tail of the ability density function at the right hand side.
Various rent-maximization solutions may be obtained, in which the density shape becomes more or less decreasing. To illustrate this, we consider three possible ability distributions: (1) uniform (f(a) = U (a) = cst), perfectly symmetric around the mean; (2) weakly decreasing, with density decreasing hyperbolically with the ability level (f(a) = cst=a); and (3) strongly decreasing, with density decreasing with the square of the ability level (f(a) = cst=a 2 ). Fig. 2 gives a schematic representation of these distributions. 
a a
The case of uniform density (un)
In the case of uniform density, the optimal discrimination tax from the majority's perspective may be written as:
Given the condition on the upper bound of the integral, two regimes may be distinguished, depending on whether t ¤ un < C=a or t ¤ un > C=a. We treat this problem in two preliminary steps, and then derive the corresponding La¤er curves, depending on whether the upper bound of the integral is C=t or a . As apparent from Fig. 3 , the La¤er curve associated to the upper bound a (called L1) applies for t ¤ un < C=a; and the La¤er curve associated to the upper bound C=t (called L2) applies for t ¤ un > C=a. In the …nal step, we compute the general La¤er curve, which combines L1 and L2 and exhibits a discontinuity point at t ¤ un = C=a. STEP 1 : DERIVATION OF THE LAFFER CURVE L1 For t < C=a, min(a; C=t) = a; so that the aggregated rent extracted is given by t£
. The solution is obtained by setting the derivative with respect to t at zero. This gives the implicit …rst-order condition:
; with h 1 (t)´1 +t (1¡t) 3 . The RHS term of this equality is clearly constant and above unity. The LHS term is an increasing and convex function of the tax rate. This gives the following result:
Lemma 1 The La¤er curve L1 (corresponding to the La¤er curve in the closed economy) has a unique interior solution: t Proof. h 1 (t) increases in t 2 [0; 1], with h 1 (0) = 1 and h 1 (1) = 1. Given assumption 1, since h 1 (t) = ³ a eR´2 for 0 < t < 1; this ensures an internal solution.
This closed economy La¤er curve is represented by the L1-curve of Fig. 3 . Note that the tax rate t ¤ 1;un corresponds to the equilibrium solution in the closed economy since it is not constrained by migration prospects.
STEP 2 : DERIVATION OF THE LAFFER CURVE L2
For t > C=a, min(a; C=t) = C=t; so that the aggregated rent is given by t £
. The derivative of the aggregated rent with respect to t is always negative (¡(
(1¡t) 2 < 0) so that this function is monotonically decreasing in t. If migration occurs, the tax rate must be as low as possible. The maximal rent is thus obtained if the tax is set to the lower bound t The equilibrium discrimination tax rate is given by the maximum of this global La¤er curve, which corresponds to the minimum of the two rates derived in steps 1 and 2. Thus: t 
giving the following general result:
Proposition 1 In the case of a uniform ability distribution: (i) migration prospects do not in ‡uence the equilibrium discrimination tax rate if migration costs are suf…ciently high; formally, t
) if and only if t ¤ 1;un < C=a; (ii) if migration costs are su¢ciently low, the equilibrium tax rate is such that the minority member with the highest ability is indi¤erent about whether to emigrate; formally, t Fig. 3b , where the maximum of the closed economy La¤er curve L1 corresponds to that of the global La¤er curve. In such cases, migration prospects do not a¤ect the level of discrimination, which is only limited by internal incentives to invest in human capital. Since migration opportunities are not relevant, it is also clear that there is no migration at equilibrium. On the contrary, if migration costs are low, from equation (6), t ¤ un = t ¤ 2;un < t ¤ 1;un . This case is shown in Fig. 3a where the maximum of the global La¤er curve corresponds to the intersection point of the curves L1 and L2. This case is obtained when the L2 curve intersects the L1 curve to the left of its maximum. In such cases, migration prospects reduce the rent-extracting power of the majority, and the equilibrium tax rate is such that even the minority members with the highest abilities choose to stay in their origin country. This is obviously due to the fact that the relative density at the right of the distribution is high: a higher tax rate would generate a large income loss. This also results in the absence of any migration at equilibrium, as shown in Fig. 4 . 
The following corollary emerges from Proposition 2:
Corollary 1 (i) The equilibrium discrimination rate is a non-increasing function of migration costs. It is strictly decreasing if migration costs are su¢ciently low; (ii) The educational investment of minority members is a non-decreasing function of the migration cost. It is strictly increasing if migration costs are su¢ciently low.
Minority members choosing to acquire education are those whose ability is higher than the threshold eR 1¡t
. Given the previous proposition, migration prospects lower the tax rate and decrease the critical value.
The case of a weakly decreasing density (wd)
If the density of the distribution decreases hyperbolically with individuals' abilities, the optimal discrimination tax from the majority's perspective is given by:
This is obtained by maximizing [ta] min(C=t;a) eR=(1¡t) with respect to t. We adopt the same three-step-methodology as in the previous section.
ST EP 1 : DERIVATION OF L1
For t < C=a, one has to maximize at ¡ teR 1¡t
(representing the L1 curve). The …rst-order condition gives the tax rate t ; which clearly belongs to the interval [0; 1], i.e., the closed economy solution is an interior solution. It is clear that the equilibrium tax rate increases with the ability range and decreases with the educational cost. This result is very similar to that in the case of a uniform distribution, except that it gives an explicit analytical solution.
ST EP 2 : DERIVATION OF L2
For t > C=a, the L2 curve is given by C ¡ teR 1¡t
. Again, the derivative of the L2 curve with respect to the tax rate is negative (-eR (1¡t) 2 < 0). The maximal rent is thus obtained when the tax rate is set to the lower bound t ¤ 2;wd = C=a .
STEP 3 : DERIVATION OF THE GLOBAL LAFFER CURVE
The global La¤er curve combines L1 and L2 and the equilibrium discrimination tax rate is given by the minimum of the rates derived in steps 1 and 2: t 
The case of a strongly decreasing density (sd)
If the density of the distribution is decreasing with the square of the ability level, the optimal discrimination tax from the majority's perspective is given by:
This is obtained by maximizing [t £ ln a]
min(C=t;a) eR=(1¡t) with respect to t.
ST EP 1 : DERIVATION OF L1
For t < C=a, the equation of the L1 curve is proportional to t ln a eR + t ln(1 ¡ t). Using the …rst-order condition, we derive the following implicit equilibrium condition,
This induces the following lemma:
Lemma 2 The L1 La¤er curve (the La¤er curve in the closed economy) has a unique interior solution: t Proof. The function g 1 (t) is monotonically increasing and convex. It starts from 0 (g 1 (0) = 0) and tends to in…nity (g 1 (1) = 1). Given assumption 1, ln a eR is positive. It follows that g 1 (t) intersects ln a eR between 0 and 1. The higher ln a eR ; the higher the tax rate at the intersection point.
ST EP 2 : DERIVATION OF L2
For t > C=a, the equation of L2 is proportional to t ln C eR ¡t ln t+t ln(1¡t). Using the …rst-order condition, we derive the following implicit equilibrium condition,
This induces the following lemma:
Lemma 3 The L2 La¤er curve has a unique interior solution: t Proof. The function g 2 (t) is monotonically increasing. It starts from minus in…n-ity (g 2 (0) = ¡1) and tends to in…nity (g 2 (1) = 1). The RHS term ln C eR ¡ 1 is either positive or negative. It follows that g 2 (t) intersects ln C eR ¡ 1 at a discrimination rate between 0 and 1. The higher ln C eR ; the higher the tax rate at the intersection point.
In the case of a strongly decreasing distribution of ability, the L2 curve becomes concave. It is increasing for low tax rates and decreasing for higher values of the tax rate.
STEP 3 : DERIVATION OF THE GLOBAL LAFFER CURVE.
The global La¤er curve combines two concave curves: L1, with a maximum at t ¤ 1;sd , and L2, with a maximum at t ¤ 2;sd . As shown in Fig. 5 , there are three possible solutions for the equilibrium discrimination tax rate: it can either be the maximum of L1; the maximum of L2; or the discontinuity point at which L1 and L2 intersect: . Several cases must therefore be distinguished:
(Case 1), there is no migration at equilibrium, and the equilibrium discrimination rate is identical to that observed in the closed economy.
;sd (Case 2), the equilibrium discrimination rate is lower than that obtained in the closed economy. However, as in the cases of a uniform or weakly decreasing distribution, it is optimal for the majority to set the tax rate so that the minority member with the highest ability is indi¤erent as to whether to emigrate; as a result, there is no migration at equilibrium in Case 2.
;sd (Case 3), as distinct from the other cases, there is migration at equilibrium. Indeed, migration prospects reduce the rate of discrimination (since t ¤ sd < t ¤ 1;sd ), but the equilibrium tax rate induces emigration for the fraction of the minority with the highest abilities (since C a < t ¤ sd ). Graphically, Case 3 emerges if the L2 curve intersects the L1 curve and both curves have a positive slope (see Fig. 5 ).
;sd (Case 4). Graphically, Case 4 also emerges if L2 is positively sloped at the intersection with, but has its maximum to the right of t ¤ 1;sd . However, such a case is theoretically irrelevant. Indeed, since L2 integrates two (internal and external) detrimental e¤ects of taxation on human capital accumulation while L1 integrates only one (internal) e¤ect, the L2 curve should be either more decreasing or less increasing than L1 at their intersection point.
The main insights of the above discussion can be summarized as follows:
Proposition 3 In the case of a strongly decreasing distribution, migration prospects reduce the equilibrium tax rate and are likely to generate e¤ective emigration if ln
Proof. E¤ective emigration is observed in case 3. A necessary and su¢cient condition to obtain Case 3 is that the slope of L2 must be positive at The condition required for observing e¤ective migrations is likely to be satis…ed when both the migration and the education costs are relatively low. Under such conditions, the open economy equilibrium tax rate is lower than that obtained in the closed economy (since the maximum of L2 must lie at the left of the maximum of L1). In Case 3, despite the e¤ective emigration of its most skilled members, the minority is still protected by migration prospects since the discrimination rate decreases. Until now, we have assumed a context of free labor mobility. In the real world, of course, prospective migrants are often constrained by immigration restrictions set by receiving countries. Such restrictive immigration policies, which are increasingly selective and biased towards the most educated, explain at least partially the overall tendency for migration rates to be much higher for the educated (Carington and Detragiache, 1999) . However, individual skills are not perfectly observable (while educational attainments are), and migrants' selection, even for the educated, generally proceeds through a kind of random selection among the candidates with appropriate educational record. As a result, uncertainty is introduced in the migration process. To account for such uncertainty, we assume that only a fraction q < 1 of the candidates for immigration is e¤ectively allowed to immigrate, while the complementary fraction 1 ¡ q is forced to remain in the home country. For analytical convenience, we limit our analysis to the case in which the ability distribution is weakly decreasing.
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The rent-maximizing government now faces the following problem:
We use the same three steps procedure as before:
ST EP 1 : DERIVATION OF L1 For t < C=a, we obtain the same L1 curve as in the case of free migration. The equilibrium tax rate is thus given by t 
ST EP 2 : DERIVATION OF L2
For t > C=a, the expected L2 curve now depends on the relative immigration quota:
. The L2 curve has a concave shape and its derivative ((1¡q)a¡ eR (1¡t) 2 ) is positive for low tax rates and negative for high tax rates. Formally, it is clear that L2 di¤ers from zero if the tax rate is zero. Nevertheless, recall that this L2 curve is only de…ned for tax rates higher than C=a. At the left of C=a, the actual La¤er curve is given by L1.
Lemma 4 In the case of a weakly decreasing (hyperbolic) distribution with a migration restriction at rate 0 < q < 1, the L2 La¤er curve has an interior maximum t . Consequently, the results in terms of discrimination and in terms of emigration ‡ows are likely to be di¤erent than in the case of free migration. More precisely, Proposition 4 In the case of a weakly decreasing (hyperbolic) distribution with a migration restriction at rate 0 < q < 1: (i) the equilibrium discrimination rate is lower or equal to that obtained in the closed economy (t ¤ mr · t ¤ 1;mr ); (ii) in contrast to the free migration case, migration restrictions increase the equilibrium rate of discrimination if the quota rate is low (1 ¡ q > eRa (a¡C) 2 ), but has no e¤ect on discrimination if the relative quota is su¢ciently high (1 ¡ q < eRa (a¡C) 2 ).
Proof. This is apparent on Fig. 6 . Graphically, the global La¤er curve still combines L1 and L2: Three possible con…gurations now have to be distinguished (see Figure 6 ):
, migration costs are so high that the closedeconomy solution applies despite migration prospects.
; the L2 curve intersects the L1 curve with a negative slope. It is then optimal for the majority to set the tax rate at C a ; in order to avoid the emigration of the most educated fringe of the minority. In this case, immigration restrictions do not modify the solution as compared to the case of free mobility.
, the L2 curve intersects the L1 curve with a positive slope. In contrast to the case of free mobility, the level of discrimination is increased and migration out ‡ows are observed. In such a case, therefore, we …nd, paradoxically, that immigration restrictions spark emigration within the ranks of the minority and have the unexpected effect of increasing the level of discrimination experienced by remaining minority members. 
Conclusion
In this paper, we adopted a political economy approach to ethnic discrimination in developing countries. Assuming a rent-extraction basis for discrimination, we modeled discrimination as a …nancial penalty levied on each educated minority member and equally redistributed among the majority. There are, therefore, two sources of ethnic inequality in our model: on the one hand, discrimination lowers the return to human capital for the minority group; on the other hand, this, in turn, decreases the number of minority members who invest in education. Focussing on the impact of migration prospects on the optimal tax rate from the majority's perspective, we found the following results. First, taking the closed-economy (no mobility) as a benchmark case, we found the intuitive result that if there are unlimited exit options to a discrimination-free country (full mobility case), such migration prospects are likely to protect the minority via a decrease in the equilibrium domestic level of discrimination (providing that migration costs are su¢ciently low). Under such circumstances, investment in education is fostered among the minority, and ethnic inequality decreases. Second, the equilibrium discrimination rate under full mobility has been shown to be strongly a¤ected by the thickness of the ability distribution tail on the right hand side. If it is su¢ciently thick (as in the cases of uniform or weakly decreasing ability distribution), the equilibrium tax rate is such that the minority member with the highest ability is indi¤erent as to whether to emigrate. If it is su¢ciently thin (as is the case for strongly decreasing ability distributions), on the contrary, migration out ‡ows are e¤ectively observed at equilibrium. Third, compared to the free migration case, we found that highly restrictive quotas are likely to increase the level of discrimination imposed on the minority group, thus inducing emigration from among its ranks. In such cases, immigration quotas have the paradoxical e¤ect of increasing ethnic discrimination in the source country and creating migration ‡ows which would otherwise have remained latent.
The issue of ethnic discrimination and con ‡ict in developing countries is a very sensitive question, and one should be extremely cautious before deriving policy implications from a purely theoretical analysis. One immediate legitimate interrogation concerns the motivation at work behind ethnic discrimination. From this perspective, the main testable implication of our model is that, everything else being equal, ethnically divided developing countries for which migration costs are substantial, or immigration quotas to the US and the EU are binding, should have their ethnic minorities subject to higher levels of domestic discrimination.
11 Regarding policy issues, it is clear that there is a growing concern for the fate of minority groups at the inter-national level. In an attempt to monitor the behavior of oppressive governments and provide protection to such groups, the international community has recently made use of its right of ingerence, threatening to implement or actually imposing economic sanctions, aid conditionality, and, occasionally, military intervention. To the extent that ethnic discrimination is rationally and socially organized for redistributive purposes, our analysis suggests that, alongside such traditional incentive/sanction mechanisms, targeted immigration policy might provide a cost-e¤ective means of protecting ethnic minorities.
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